CEO influence on the board of directors: Evidence from corporate spinoffs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We utilize a sample of spinoff firms that need to form a new board of directors, to shed light on the chief executive officer (CEO) influence hypothesis. We find spinoff boards with a CEO who was the parent firm CEO to be similarly structured to the boards of industry and size-matched peers, whereas spinoff boards with nonparent CEOs are structured for greater monitoring. Consistent with our board structure results, the CEO compensation and replacement decisions of parent CEO spinoff boards are more lenient toward spinoff CEOs, whereas those of nonparent CEO spinoff boards are more consistent with protecting shareholder benefits.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1324-1349
Number of pages26
JournalEuropean Financial Management
Volume26
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2020

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Accounting
  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Keywords

  • board of directors
  • CEO compensation
  • CEO influence
  • CEO turnover
  • spinoff

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'CEO influence on the board of directors: Evidence from corporate spinoffs'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this