Did Strategic Behavior End Roe v. Wade?

Franklin G. Mixon, Rand W. Ressler, Benno Torgler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Decision making in the U.S. Supreme court offers a fascinating context in which to apply game theory. Landmark cases in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court are worth exploring in more detail from a game-theoretic point of view. We focus in this paper on the recent and much discussed ruling to overturn Roe v. Wade and, therefore, the constitutional right to an abortion. Using a game-theoretic framework, we discuss how leaking Justice Samuel Alito's draft opinion to the national political media can be seen as an unconditional strategic move referred to as cutting off communication, making an action irreversible. In this case, it served conservative justices by cutting off communication between Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature demonstrating how straightforward game theory can be fruitfully applied to the study of constitutional economics.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)215-230
Number of pages16
JournalReview of Behavioral Economics
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 24 2025

Scopus Subject Areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Social Psychology
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Keywords

  • bargaining
  • coalition building
  • constitutional economics
  • game theory
  • right to abortion
  • Roe v. Wade
  • Supreme Court economics

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