Exploring the influence of wealth on judicial decision making

Objective: Attention to levels of socioeconomic inequality has given rise to work investigating its potential to influence political actors and, thus, policy outcomes. These studies have focused on elected actors in legislative contexts. Ours fills this gap by assessing the consequences of a judge's wealth on decision making. Methods: We obtain data on federal appellate judges’ wealth and explore its influence in cases involving economic issues. We estimate logit models controlling for other factors and include fixed effects for circuit, specific issue area, and year of the decision. The models consider both the main effects of wealth and its potential interaction with judicial ideology to influence decision making. Results: We find no direct relationship between a judge's wealth and her decision making in economic cases. However, wealth interacts with ideology to exert a significant influence on decision making; here, greater wealth amplifies the ideological predilections of more conservative judges. Conclusions: This is the first study to document a link between wealth and the choices judges make on the bench. It adds a new dimension to the ways economic inequality can influence political actors and raises new questions about the mechanisms by which such inequality is consequential for elite political behavior.