Loyal Political Cartels and Committee Assignments in Congress: Evidence from the Congressional Black Caucus

Franklin G. Mixon, Rand W. Ressler

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11 Scopus citations

Abstract

This study presents a political model which suggests that monopoly legislators form cartel-like organizations (referred to as ``memberships'') in an effort to extract greater benefits in the political process. Based on a model by Coker and Crain (1994)that provides theoretical and statistical arguments for congressional committees as loyalty-generating institutions, the instant research examines committee placement of ``members'' of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in the U.S. House by Democrat leaders. Voting records indicate that the CBC is uniform in its voting patterns, indicating cartel-like behavior. Because of this, the Democratic leadership in the House chooses to place CBC members on important committees in order to support their policy agenda. The general finding of this study is that ``black representation'' may be greater than simply the proportion of seats held by black Representatives. "Legislators differ substantially by virtue of their committee assignments. Committees in Congress, and particularly in the House of Representatives, possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions, have the right to hold hearings, and recommend budget allocations for ...bureaus ..."
Original languageAmerican English
JournalPublic Choice
Volume108
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2001

Disciplines

  • Finance and Financial Management
  • Business

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