Abstract
We argue that the Supreme Court's long-term goal of maintaining legitimacy and institutional power reflects an underdeveloped strategic consideration in models of judicial decision making. Our article posits that both institutional- and policy-related incentives exist for the Court to engage in strategic behavior, and that those motivations may be differentially applicable to decision making in constitutional versus statutory cases. Our results offer broad confirmation of the above hypotheses, providing an important supplement to our understanding of how Congress may affect the Supreme Court's role in constructing legal policy.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 37-76 |
| Number of pages | 40 |
| Journal | Politics and Policy |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 2014 |
Scopus Subject Areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
Keywords
- Civil Liberties and Rights Cases 1953-2000
- Constitutional and Statutory Cases
- Court-Curbing
- Institutional Power
- Judicialization of Politics
- Judiciary
- Legitimacy
- Modeling
- Separation of Powers
- Strategic Decision Making
- Supreme Court
- U.S. Congress
