Abstract
This study explores how rent seeking in the U.S. casino gambling industry relates to unique issues concerning industry structure. To do so, we apply mathematical and graphical approaches from industrial economics to the history of land-based casino gambling in New Orleans, Louisiana, a history that includes public franchising, successive monopoly, vertical separation and integration, and rent seeking costs. Our conceptual approach highlights how local governments can gain advantages over higher forms of government ( e.g. , state government) in rent seeking contests.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review |
| Volume | 11 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 1 2014 |
Keywords
- Casino gambling
- Public choice
- Rent seeking
- Successive monopoly
- Vertical integration
DC Disciplines
- Business Administration, Management, and Operations
- Economics
- Finance
- Finance and Financial Management