Resilient-by-Design Control for in Situ Primary Controller of Grid-Following Inverter-Based Resources by A Novel State Augmentation to Tolerate False Data Injection Cyberattacks

With the increasing number of three-phase grid-following (GFL) inverter-based resources (IBRs) in modern power grids deploying cyber-physical systems, they are required to possess more intelligence with diverse functionality and communication capabilities. However, the cyber threats of smart inverters are omnipresent due to the immense usage of data and communication devices. This paper proposes a novel resilient vector current control strategy for GFL IBRs to alleviate the destructive impacts of false data injection (FDI) attacks while ensuring the stability and desired performance of GFL IBRs. Even with proper upper-layer control mechanisms in place, attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in GFL IBR's primary control, specifically 'inverter output controller.' In such cases, FDI attacks can manipulate the control commands sent to the pulse width modulator, thereby adversely impacting the quality of the output power. To this end, auxiliary control states are augmented and incorporated into the state feedback controller of GFL IBRs, thus enhancing resilient performance against FDI attacks. Theoretical analysis using Lyapunov theory and matrix properties rigorously supports the proof of stability and extends control design considerations. Comparative simulations and experimental results illustrate the resilience and effective functionality of the proposed control scheme.