TY - JOUR
T1 - Resilient Cooperative Secondary Control of Islanded AC Microgrids Utilizing Inverter-Based Resources Against State-Dependent False Data Injection Attacks
AU - Jamali, Mahmood
AU - Sadabadi, Mahdieh S.
AU - Davari, Masoud
AU - Sahoo, Subham
AU - Blaabjerg, Frede
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1982-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2024/5/1
Y1 - 2024/5/1
N2 - In this article, we investigate the impact of potential state-dependent false data injection cyber-attacks on frequency synchronization and active power management in islanded ac microgrids. One potential way of affecting microgrid reliability is by forcing a generation outage. Thus, the attacker could potentially aim to desynchronize inverter-based resources in microgrids by manipulating their frequency with malicious injections. The attack signals are injected to manipulate control input channels, sensor nodes, reference values, and the information exchanged through communication networks. In order to mitigate the adverse impacts of such cyber-attacks, first, the conventional distributed consensus-based secondary control approach is modified and complemented in the presence of cyber-attacks. Second, a resilient cooperative distributed secondary control scheme is proposed by utilizing the concept of a virtual layer interconnected with the main network layer. Third, theoretical stability, resilience analysis, and design considerations of interconnection matrices are also provided. Finally, simulations through MATLAB/Simulink and experimental results are presented in order to illustrate the robust performance of the proposed control scheme.
AB - In this article, we investigate the impact of potential state-dependent false data injection cyber-attacks on frequency synchronization and active power management in islanded ac microgrids. One potential way of affecting microgrid reliability is by forcing a generation outage. Thus, the attacker could potentially aim to desynchronize inverter-based resources in microgrids by manipulating their frequency with malicious injections. The attack signals are injected to manipulate control input channels, sensor nodes, reference values, and the information exchanged through communication networks. In order to mitigate the adverse impacts of such cyber-attacks, first, the conventional distributed consensus-based secondary control approach is modified and complemented in the presence of cyber-attacks. Second, a resilient cooperative distributed secondary control scheme is proposed by utilizing the concept of a virtual layer interconnected with the main network layer. Third, theoretical stability, resilience analysis, and design considerations of interconnection matrices are also provided. Finally, simulations through MATLAB/Simulink and experimental results are presented in order to illustrate the robust performance of the proposed control scheme.
KW - False data injection (FDI)
KW - inverter-based resources (IBRs)
KW - islanded ac microgrids
KW - resilient active power sharing
KW - resilient cooperative control
KW - resilient frequency synchronization
KW - state-dependent FDI cyber-attacks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85162688859&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TIE.2023.3281698
DO - 10.1109/TIE.2023.3281698
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85162688859
SN - 0278-0046
VL - 71
SP - 4719
EP - 4730
JO - IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics
JF - IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics
IS - 5
ER -