Sex and Selling: Agent Gender and Bargaining Power in the Resale Housing Market

Duong T. Pham, Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Bennie D. Waller

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper uses a search model with Nash bargaining to identify various channels through which agent gender affects selling price and selling time in the resale market for houses. The theory is used in conjunction with the empirical model to infer agent bargaining power when dealing with the same or opposite sex agents on the other side of the transaction. The results reveal that sellers set higher listing prices when working with male agents, a pattern consistent with sellers’ ex ante beliefs that male agents enjoy greater expected bargaining power. Ex post agent bargaining power varies by sex and their role in the transaction. Female agents assisting buyers have stronger bargaining power when facing male listing agents than when facing female agents in rising or falling markets. The ex post bargaining power of male selling agents assisting buyers appears to be generally weaker than that of female listing agents.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)473-499
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
Volume64
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2022

Keywords

  • Agent gender
  • Bargaining power
  • Real estate agents

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