Strategic Interaction between Rebels and the State: A Study of the Maoist Conflict in Nepal

The “people's war” in Nepal during 1996–2006, led to two significant outcomes—the elimination of monarchy and political victory for the Maoists. These political outcomes raise important questions about the process of Maoist conflict in Nepal. While several studies on political conflict are concerned about “why” such conflicts happen, I focus on “how” the strategy of conflict unfolded in Nepal. In this article, I argue that strategic interaction between rebels and the state explain why the conflict led to negotiated settlement in Nepal. To discuss the sequence of rebel–state interaction, I introduce a game theoretic model. In addition, I show how territorial control, target selection, and levels of violence used by the rebels in comparison to the state are crucial in understanding the conflict process. The case study in this article analyzes the relevance of rebel–state interaction to reveal micro processes of political conflict and further suggests that negotiation can become an important tactical choice in resolving conflict.