Union Influence and Right-to-Work Law passage: Evidence from Hazard Model Estimates

Urban and labor economists have examined macro and micro effects of the passage of right-to-work laws in various states. These laws prohibit unions from negotiating bargains that require new and previous hires to join the union. The results have been suggestive, pointing out that cost-of-living indices are dramatically influenced by the presence of unionized workers. This analysis describes the economic and political evolution necessary for the legal passage of right-to-work laws. Although individual studies have pointed out that a low degree of unionization is necessary for the passage of such laws, no study has attempted to describe the timing of the decline in unionization rates as it relates to the passage of these laws. To test this thesis, a discrete-time or hazard model is employed. Evidence suggests that a low threshold of union activity must be reached before an individual state will adopt such labor laws. Also important in the analysis is the degree of construction and manufacturing within each state, as well as public choice determinants of legislative activity such as the role of the Democratic Party. The discrete-time model suggests that a declining union membership is important in determining the "timing" of the adoption of right-to-work laws by states, as well as the actual adoption of these laws by states.